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I. PROLOGUE

T

HE OBJECT of the international law decision-making pro-

cess is to secure for the nations of the world the widest possible
distribution of shared values, or preferred events, through the
peaceful balancing of competing interests.
The distillation of
value-conserving decisions from particular confrontations hinges
on the ability and willingness of policy makers to scrutinize the
factual contexts giving rise to the opposing claims and to apply,
on a case-by-case basis, the continuously evolving and necessarily flexible prescriptions of customary and treaty law. This
must be done in such a fashion as to promote simultaneously,and to the greatest degree possible, both the inclusive interests
of mankind as a whole and the exclusive interests of individual
claimants. To the extent that exclusive claims are asserted irrespective of or against common inclusive interests, they must be
rejected.1
On those relatively infrequent occasions when confrontation
between conflicting interests assumes crisis proportions, any number of factors such as nationalistic pride, public reaction, and fear
of imminent and uncontrollable violence may conspire to impair
the effectiveness of the decision-making process. Such was the
case in both the Pueblo and Mayaguez affairs. Although the outcome of the decision-making process in each instance cannot be
reversed, it is hoped that a legal analysis of the similar sets of
claims and counterclaims surrounding the two incidents will highlight the mistakes made and suggest a need to modify, in certain
respects, the management of post-Vietnam crisis diplomacy.

II.
A.

THE FACT SITUATIONS COMPARED AND CONTRASTED

Location

The unexpected seizures of the Pueblo and Mayaguez, although
frequently denounced as examples of piracy, were in fact sanctioned by the Communist regimes in North Korea and Cambodia
and therefore do not fit the accepted definition of piracy as acts
of private violence on the high seas by persons seeking to rob and
murder for their own ends.2 Nonetheless, attempts to characterize these seizures as priacy reflect a significant feature common to
the two incidents: Both occurred on waters presumed by the rest
I M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANs 37 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as McDOUGAL & BURKE].
2 Id. at 806.
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of the world to be part of the high seas. When the Pueblo was
captured at 2:30 p.m. local time, on January 23, 1968, she was on
station 16 miles from the Korean coast. Similarly, the Mayaguez,
when fired upon and boarded on May 12, 1975, was steaming in
regular commercial shipping channels, 60 miles southwest of Cambodia and 7 miles from the tiny, uninhabited Wai Islands, claimed
by Thailand, South Vietnam, and Cambodia. There can be no
doubt that the major factor which led to these crisis-producing
confrontations was the sudden collapse of a premise which had
been assumed at every level of responsibility and upon which all
plans for both voyages had been based - that of freedom of the
3
high seas.
B.

Ship Profile and Mission

The Pueblo was a Navy Electronics Intelligence (ELINT)
ship, a 24-year old converted cargo hauler equipped with the latest in radar and radio gear and designed for the sole purpose
of eavesdropping on the Communists. Her armament consisted
merely of two 50-caliber machine guns. 4 The information obtained
by such a "snoop" ship provides the strategists of the Defense
Intelligence Agency and other federally-controlled think-tanks
with the details necessary to anticipate and react to Communist
maneuvers around the world. It was just such information gathered by ELINT vessels in the Caribbean that alerted the United
States to Russian efforts to install missiles in Cuba. 5
By contrast, the Mayaguez was not a U. S. man-of-war but a
31-year old container ship owned by Sea-Land Service, Incorporated, of Menlo Park, New Jersey. 6 Completely unarmed, she
was en route from Hong Kong to Thailand with a cargo of commercial goods and supplies for U. S. servicemen when seized by a
Cambodian gunboat. Confronted with machine gun blasts and
rocket fire, she could do little but assent to the gestured commands of those who boarded her.
C.

Prior Warnings Issued by Captors
Perhaps the greatest irony inherent in the facts surrounding

3 Statement of Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee on Pueblo Court of
Inquiry, May 6, 1969, in D. GALLERY, THE PUEBLO INCIDENT 173 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as GALLERY].
4 GALLERY, supra note 3, at 2.
s id.
6 TIME, May 26, 1975, at 10.
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the two seizures concerns prior Communist threats which failed to
reach the commanding officers of the Pueblo and Mayaguez. Just
before the Pueblo sailed on her last voyage, the North Koreans
broadcast a radio message to the effect that they would take drastic action against any snooper ships sighted near their coast. In
response to this thinly-veiled threat of attack, the National Security Agency sent a recommendation to the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff,
urging a re-evaluation of the "minimal risk" classification that
had been placed upon the Pueblo's mission. The communication
circulated through the lower staff levels of the JCS before it was
rerouted to the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command. 7 However, it never penetrated that protective cordon of lower-echelon red tape which occasionally insulates the "brass" all too effectively, keeping from
our military commanders matters, such as this, that may weigh
heavily on the safety of U. S. operating units. The Pueblo's mission thus retained its "minimal risk" status because of a thoroughly predictable breakdown in communications.
Consequently, her crew was unprepared to take effective countermeasures
against the Korean attack. Not only were the men incapable of
resistance, but their efforts to scuttle ELINT gear and records
were largely unsuccessful.8
During the month prior to the capture of the Mayaguez, similar rumblings were heard from the recently-installed Communist
government of Cambodia. 9 For reasons which remain unclear to
this day, neither the owners nor the captain of the Mayaguez ever
received word that the Cambodians had fired on, captured, and
presumably released 25 ships and fishing boats steaming in the
very lanes through which the container ship would pass. Had
this information been publicized by the Federal Government, it
seems plausible that American shipping interests would have demanded and received at least token naval protection in that area
until such time as the world community forced the Cambodians to
cease their depredations on international commerce. Instead, a
wholly avoidable confrontation ensued, costing lives and property
on both sides.
D.

The Communist Rationale

As evidenced by their radioed threats against U. S. ELINT
GALLERY,

supra note 3, at 12.

8 Id. at 39.
9 Supra note 6.
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vessels, the Koreans were at least superficially concerned with
protecting their coastal security, even if this meant attacking the
Pueblo in international waters and subsequently trying to camouflage the illegality of their aggression by extorting from the United
States an admission that the spy-ship had invaded the Korean
12-mile territorial sea. The irony of this rationale is that, after
escorting the Pueblo to Wonsan, the Koreans demonstrated no
interest in the top secret information and electronic equipment
contained aboard their prize. Instead of concerning themselves
with whatever data had been collected by the "snoop" ship, they
simply turned the whole thing over to the Chinese Communists,
presumably because the latter possessed the 'technology necessary
to interpret the information and utilize the gear left undestroyed
by the Americans. The Koreans then devoted most of the following year to extracting confessions from their captives, which
they used for propaganda purposes. 10
Although subsequent legal analysis will deal with the validity
of the Korean claim to authority based on national security, it seems
fair to conclude at this point that the casual manner in which the
Pueblo's captors disposed of her and the purposes for which they
detained her crew .completely destroy the credibility of the rationale
asserted by the Communists as justification for their action.
When the Mayaguez was captured, the world community could
only speculate as to what rationale would be offered by the Cambodians. In some circles, the seizure was seen as an attempt by the
new Communist-backed 'regime to kick sand at the United States,
the last of whose combat troops had abandoned the deposed Lon
Nol government just a few weeks earlier. Those of a more legal,
and perhaps less skeptical, bent theorized that the Cambodians
were claiming possession of the uninhabited Wai Islands and any
oil deposits that might exist thereunder. Finally, after several
days, Cambodian Information Minister Hon Nim announced
that his government had considered the Mayaguez part of a complex CIA spy operation and had seized her on suspicion of transporting arms to anti-Communist factions in Southeast Asia." t
Of course the legal validity of the Cambodian claim to authority,
which included the right to remove the crew from the ship and
transport them to the mainland, collapses along with the credibil10Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on the USS Pueblo of the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 946 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
1 Supra note 6.
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ity of Hon Nim's proffered rationale when it is recalled that a
search of the ship disclosed only commercial goods in cargo lockers. Knowing the contents of the containers, the Cambodians
nonetheless removed the ship from commercial channels and ferried the crew to Kompong Som.
E.

The U. S. Responses

To understand the seemingly irreconcilable disparity between
the official American responses in the Pueblo and Mayaguez incidents, it is necessary to examine the major factors contributing
to each response. These factors include the degree to which command control was effectively centralized in each instance, the prevailing U. S. political climate at the time of each seizure, and
the extent to which fear of escalation may have influenced the
decision-makers in Washington, D. C.
Commander Lloyd Bucher of the Pueblo, facing 57 millimeter
cannon fire from a North Korean submarine chaser as well as
the prospect of having his ship strafed by MiG fighters overhead,
decided not to use his machine guns to resist the boarders. Instead, his strategy was to proceed as slowly as possible astern of
the Wonsan-bound sub chaser and await what he thought would be
the swift retaliatory deployment of American air power in response
to his SOS. Although the planes of the USS Enterprise were only
an hour's flying time away, none of the officers in the chain of
command linking the Enterprise's task group with the headquarters
of Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), ordered any countermeasures. The reason for this is two-fold.
First, the Pueblo transmitted only two official messages on the afternoon of her capture and neither indicated anything more serious
than the usual harassment 'to which American vessels are generally
subjected by Korean fishing boats. The rest of the news from
Pueblo, including her SOS, was transmitted as unofficial chatter
between radio operators. 12 Naturally none of the higher-ups was
willing, on the basis of unofficial operator chatter, to do anything
more than relay word of what was happening up the chain of
command to Washington, D. C. Second, the Pueblo, like other
intelligence-gathering ships, was subject to the direct operational
control of the Secretary of Defense and the Pentagon. 13 The
military command structure, from CNO through CINCPAC
supra note 3, at 62.
at 6. It is interesting to note that the lieutenant in charge of Pueblo's
ELINT gear had a direct line to Washington, D.C. Orders from the Pentagon
12 GALLERY,
13 Id.
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down to Commander Naval Forces, Japan (Bucher's immediate
superior), merely supplied Pueblo with logistic support, not military
direction. Thus, upon receiving word of her predicament, all
commands felt obliged to look to Washington, where responsibility for the Pueblo presumably rested, before assuming the risk of
retaliation.
Doubtless, had the Pueblo been assigned to the Enterprise's task group, the officer in charge there would have taken
immediate action to rescue her; but no one was willing to stick his
neck out for an unknown vessel, not even assigned to the Seventh
Fleet, and controlled directly by the Pentagon.
Certainly the Pueblo affair highlights the problems caused by
division of responsibility in crisis situations. Although she was a
Navy ship and as such deserved naval protection, the fact that
the Pentagon exercised direct and exclusive operational control
over her prevented local commands from reacting without first
seeking approval from Washington. Consequently, nothing was
done during the 6 hours Pueblo remained at sea after the boarding.
When she reached Wonsan, U. S. policy-makers decided that any
attempts to retrieve her would smack of retaliation and could lead
to a second Korean War. 14 They decided to refer the matter to
the U. N. Security Council.
By contrast, control over the Mayaguez affair was immediately
and effectively centralized in the office of the President. Throughout the crisis, State Department spokesman Robert Funseth reiterated to reporters that management of the situation was "a
Presidential action.'15 Certainly this swift and undivided assumption of responsibility at the highest level figured prominently in the release of the Mayaguez and her crew.
The prevailing U. S. political climate at the time of the Pueblo
incident reflected mounting dissatisfaction with the Vietnam conflict and a concomitant aversion to any further entanglement in
Southeast Asia. Naturally, once the spy ship was inside Wonsan
Harbor, few would countenance the introduction of military forces
into Korea for the purpose of retrieving her. The mistaken hope
was that by referring the matter to the U. N. Security Council
the United States could pressure the North Koreans into releasing the ship and crew.
actually by-passed Bucher, who was informed of their content only on a "needto-know" basis.
14See statement of Adm. Ulysses Sharp before The Special Subcommittee
on the I'SS Inelhlo
of the House Committee on Armed Services,, Mar. 17,
1969, in Hearings, supra note 10, at 797.
15 Supra note 6, at 12.
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On the other hand, the Mayaguez rescue took place at a time

when many Americans, although relieved by the withdrawal of
troops from Southeast Asia, were nonetheless depressed and bitter
over the totality of the American defeat in Cambodia. The President, no doubt aware that circumstances had presented him with

a unique opportunity to revitalize the spirit of the nation, to discredit those who had labelled him a "do-nothing" Chief Executive, and to restore the international credibility of the country,
used military force to obtain the release of the Mayaguez. His ac-

tion by and large met with public approval.

As James Reston

explained in the New York Times, "the main thing that has hap-

pened is that Uncle Sam went out of Cambodia and slammed the
door.""6

Thus, while the political climate of the country in 1968

made any forceful efforts to retrieve Pueblo unthinkable, the popular mood in 1974 fairly demanded a swift military response.

A final point must be made on the extent to which fear of
escalation might have in part determined the nature of the Amer-

ican responses to the Pueblo and Mayaguez seizures. As Admiral
Sharp's testimony before the Armed Services Committee 7 indicated, the prevailing view in Washington was that once the Pueblo

entered Wonsan Harbor any U. S. countermeasures would greatly
increase the probability of a major military confrontation with
Korea. Although this contention is a serious one, it is difficult
to see how the North Koreans could have escalated in such fashion
as to pose a significant threat to the United States.' 8 Had
America chosen to retrieve the Pueblo by force after diplomatic
negotiations had failed, the action would have involved relatively
few troops and would have consumed less than a day. The Russians could have been expected not to intervene for the same
reason that the United States refrained from acting when the
Soviet Union invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia - fear of
atomic war. 19 Lacking Russian military support, the Koreans in
all likelihood would have decided to release the Pueblo and her
crew without a fight. Nevertheless, at least during the Pueblo
crisis, fear of escalation coupled with popular anti-war sentiments
served to quash any plans to recapture the spy ship.
The President's decision to obtain release of the Mayaguez by
16Quoted in Morris, What to Make of Mayaquez, NEW
1975, at 9.
17Hearings, supra note 10, at 797.
18GALLERY, supra note 3, at 64.
19 Id.

REPUBLIC,

June 14,
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force following Cambodia's apparent rejection of American diplomatic efforts reflects not so much a cavalierness on his part with
respect to the possibility of escalation as it does a determination
to avoid another Pueblo fiasco. Recalling the cruelty with which
the Koreans had treated Bucher and his men, the President announced that a slight over-response to the Mayaguez seizure was
a risk worth taking in light of his belief that the Khmer Rouge
2°
was equally capable of inflicting brutality on foreign captives.
Thus, although the President could not be certain that a minor
military confrontation in this instance would not lead to all-out
war, the ghost of Pueblo compelled him to action irrespective of
the fear of escalation that had paralyzed the decision-makers in
1968.
Subsequent events upheld the reasoning of those who
would have forcibly retrieved Pueblo from Wonsan 6 years earlier
- deployment of amphibious assault units and selective bombing
of mainland targets did not result in escalation, although it is
questionable, as will be demonstrated later, whether these measures in fact effected the release of the Mayaguez crew.
III.

THE CENTRAL LEGAL ISSUES

The Pueblo and Mayaguez incidents together reflect three major legal issues. First, are the seizures justified as reasonable
assertions of authority beyond the territorial sea, necessary to
protect exclusive coastal interests and not unduly restrictive of
inclusive use of the high seas? Assessment of the reasonableness
of the Communist actions involves balancing those concrete factors supporting the particular claim to exclusive authority against
other factors traditionally used to uphold the inclusive interest
of the world community in free access to the high seas. This balancing process requires a case-by-case approach that fully utilizes the factual contexts in which particular claims arise and
avoids the rigid application of abstract principles to concrete situations. Factors relevant to a determination of the reasonableness
of the Communist claims might include: The significance of the
coastal interest sought to be protected, the relationship between
the authority claimed and the interest at stake, the types of inclusive activities affected, the frequency of their occurrence, the significance of such activities for the general community, the modality and degree of interference with these activities, and the
duration of the interference.21
20Supra note 6, at 12.
21 McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 765.
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The second legal issue common to both the Pueblo and Mayaguez seizures is whether or not the Communists complied with
the requirements of international law relevant to the use of military coercion. Discussion will focus on the theory of anticipatory self-defense as a rationale for the Communist actions.
The third legal issue concerns the validity, under international
law, of the responding coercion effected by the United States
following the capture of the Mayaguez. Resolution of this question will facilitate an overall evaluation of the U. S. responses to
the Pueblo and Mayaguez takings.
IV.

ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPETING U.

S. AND COMMUNIST CLAIMS

TO AUTHORITY IN TERMS OF THE APPLICABLE LAW OF THE SEA

A.

The Development in InternationalLaw of the Concept
of a Contiguous Zone Adjacent to the Territorial Sea

The Communist seizures of the Pueblo and Mayaguez represented efforts to apply exclusive authority 22 in areas beyond the
12-mile territorial sea publicly claimed by both North Korea and
Cambodia at the time of each incident. 23 That the breadth of
the territorial sea asserted by these countries was and remains 12
miles and therefore does not encompass the areas of capture serves
to focus legal analysis upon claims to apply authority outside the
territorial sea and not upon claims to determine the width of the
territorial sea. 24 Had either North Korea or Cambodia announced an expansion of its territorial waters beyond the breadth
asserted at the time of each taking, an examination of claims
relevant to a unilateral determination of the width of the territorial
sea would have been necessary in evaluating the validity of the Communist actions.
1. The Historical Basis and Underlying Rationale of the Contiguous
Zone Concept. The concept of a contiguous zone of indeterminate
breadth immediately outside the territorial sea has evolved in response to the continual conflict between two opposing, yet complementary principles - territorial sovereignty and freedom of the
22 The distinction drawn by McDougal and Burke between the competence
to "prescribe" policy and the competence to "apply" policy is irrelevant here.

A showing that the competence to "apply" was unlawful will obviously nullify

the practical validity of the claimed competence to "prescribe."
23 2

LAY,

CHURCHILL

&

NORDQUIST,

NEW

DIRECTIONS

IN THE

LAW OF THE

SEA

838-39 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CHURCHILL]. The breadth of the territorial
sea claimed by Cambodia is presumed to be the width asserted in her last
public announcement on the subject, made in 1969 by the Lon Nol regime.
24See generally, McDOUGAL & BURKE, chs. 5 & 6.
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high seas. 25 Although in modern times, a policy fostering unrestricted access to the high seas is preferred because of its beneficial effect on world-wide transportation and communication, such
has not always been the case. Prior to the 19th century, many
European States asserted proprietary claims over large areas of the
high seas in order to further their own recognized policy interests.
James I of England applied the doctrine of mare clausum in 1674 to
exclude the Dutch from the North Sea fisheries. 26 Denmark
claimed sovereign rights in all northern seas between Norway,
Ireland, and Greenland.27 In the Mediterranean, competing sovereign claims by the Italian States seeking to monopolize foreign
trade resulted in the total abolition of the policy of freedom of the
sea between the 11th and 16th centuries. 2 Colombos notes, "Up
to the end of the eighteenth century there was no part of the seas
surrounding Europe free from the claims of proprietary rights by
individual powers, nor were there any seas over which such rights
were not exercised in varying degrees."29
From the beginning of the 19th century, Britain, whose maritime economy obviously depended on the extent of its free access
to all the oceans of the world, took the lead in pursuing and furthering the modern policy of freedom of the seas) 0 Thus, in 1821,
she supported the fledgling United States against Russia's claim
to exclude all foreign shipping from a 100-mile belt of ocean around
Alaska, but opposed the United States 65 years later when America attempted to extend its jurisdiction over the seal fishery in
the Bering Sea. 31 In this century, the United States, as one of
the two modern maritime powers, has perpetuated the British
policy of free access.
Two interrelated aspects of the foregoing historical sketch of
the policy of freedom of the seas deserve to be emphasized.
First, the notion of free access to the oceans of the world is usually
wielded as an ideological tool when the national interest of its
proponent so requires. 32 Hence, freedom of the seas is to be advocated by, for example, Great Britain when it allows that country
25 Brown, Maritime Zones: A Survey of Claims, 3 CH4URCHILL 157 (1973).
2 C. J. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 55 (1967).
27 Id. at 49.

28

Id.

29 Id. at 48.
30 Brown, supra note 25, at 158.
31

Id.

32 Id.
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to reject Russian or American claims to exclusive competence in
the Bering Sea; however, it is to be ignored as a principle of ir.ternational law when James I wants to protect North Sea fisheries
from the Dutch. Second, it frequently happens that when State
A, under the banner of freedom of the seas, asserts competence
to use for some purpose the waters off the coast of State B, the
latter may wish to protect what it considers its own sovereign
interests by challenging State A's claim to authority. Conversely,
when State B seeks to exercise exclusive competence within its
coastal waters under the principle of territorial sovereignty, State
A will object, asserting freedom of the seas. History therefore
indicates that: (a) The same State will support on one occasion the
principle of territorial sovereignty and, on another, freedom of the
seas, depending on where lies its national interest; and (b) disputes giving rise to confrontations between these two principles
will likely occur within the territorial sea of one of the States, or
in the waters adjacent thereto. The whole situation resembles
a tug-o'-war contest with States switching sides as the prize is
changed.
From this background of conflict has evolved the useful concept of the contiguous zone to serve as a flexible buffer between,
on the one hand, the territorial sea and the principle of state
sovereignty which predominates therein and, on the other, the
high seas and the principle of free access, which limits, and in
turn is limited by, assertions of territorial sovereignty. On the
landward side of a particular contiguous zone, that is, within the
territorial sea, the coastal State may, under compelling circum33
stances and in accordance with the standard of reasonableness,
control or deny access to foreign ships whose activities are realistically perceived to affect adversely its exclusive interests. 31 Thus,
a coastal State may, subject to the right of innocent passage afforded ships of all other nations, exercise protective sovereignty
over its own territorial waters. 35 By contrast, on the opposite side
of a contiguous zone, that is,-on the high seas, the coastal state
may exercise plenary authority only over its own vessels36 those flying its flag. Here, the principle, of freedom of the seas
prohibits all other claims to sovereignty. The contiguous zone
33 McDOUGAL & BURKE 765.

11Id. ch. 3.
35 Convention

on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29,

1958, 15 U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, at art. 14.
16 McDOUGAL & BURKE
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concept accommodates conflicting claims based on both principles
in an area, adjacent to the territorial sea, whose breadth will vary
on a situational basis in accordance with the extent to which the
disputed activities may be realistically perceived to have a unique
- though not necessarily adverse - impact on the social processes
of the coastal State. 37 Claims arising from activities so demonstrated to have occurred in a contiguous zone will be evaluated in accordance with the standard of reasonableness and the
balancing process described at the beginning of Section 11. The
object of such evaluation should be to promote simultaneously,
and to the greatest degree possible, both the inclusive interests of
the world community and the exclusive interests of individual
claimants.
2. The Practical Effect of the Contiguous Zone Concept. The
overall effect of the contiguous zone concept has clearly been
to allow coastal States in certain instances to assert claims of
limited competence beyond the territorial sea. More precisely,
the historic function of the contiguous zone concept has been that
of authorizing coastal States to secure unilaterally the reasonable
protection of certain exclusive interests without permitting them
to indulge in an expansion of that comprehensive competence which
is associated with their control of the territorial sea and internal
waters. 38 Thus, reasonableness might, for example, dictate that
a State be allowed to exert within a zone contiguous to its territorial waters whatever control necessary for the limited purpose of
preventing infringement of its customs regulations. Other examples of legally recognized claims to competence in the contiguous zone will comprise part of the following evaluation of Communist actions during the Pueblo and Mayaguez affairs.
B.

The Communist Claims to Authority in Ocean Areas
Adjacent to the Territorial Sea

1. Examples of Costal State Claims to Authority in the Contiguous Zone Recognized in International Law. As Professors McDougal
and Burke point out, 39 in order to preserve the inclusive interest
of the world community in maintaining free access to the high seas
and to prevent the recurrence of multiple unilateral claims to exclusive authority over vast ocean areas, 40 it is necessary to place
37 Id.

at 565.

38Id. at 578.
39Id.

at 575.

40 COLOMBOS,

supra note 26, at 55.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 9: 79

a rational limit on the width of a territorial sea which may be
claimed by coastal States. This in turn requires that those States
be allowed to claim certain limited authority for special purposes
beyond the territorial sea, in order that they may exercise such
reasonable competence as their special interests demand without
having to widen the territorial sea to satisfy their purposes. Thus,

the extent to which reasonable claims to authority in the contiguous zone have been legally recognized reflects both a demonstration of the relationship between those claims and the interests
sought to be protected as well as a realization that the preserva-

tion of freedom of the high seas depends on allowing such claims.
Article 24 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone provides a convenient starting point for a
brief survey of legally recognized claims to authority in the contiguous zone. Although, as will be demonstrated, clumsy drafting prevents the article from accurately reflecting the intent of a
majority of the negotiators, 41 it nevertheless codifies the major
types of contiguous zone claims sanctioned by law.
In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea,
the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial
sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.
The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles
from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured.42
The Article has been criticized on two grounds as being too restrictive in its effect on the competence of coastal States. First,
the specification of four permissible types of claims and the placing of a 12-mile limit on the width of the contiguous zone are
viewed as bearing no relation either to the flexibilities in widths
honored in previous practice or to the myriad new oceanic interests that States may be expected to acquire as a result of developments in technology.43 Second, a literal reading of the Article
indicates that the authority of the coastal State is restricted to the
prevention and punishment of infringements of regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea. The State thus has no
competence to prevent or punish such activities occurring in the
41 McDoUGAL & BURKE

619.

42 Convention, supra note 35, at 210.
43 McDOUGAL & BURKE
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contiguous zone; rather its authority appears to be limited to
implementing measures of surveillance and inquiry which would
enable it to forecast and prevent violations within the territorial
sea. 44 Interestingly, an attempt was made, in the form of the following proposal by Poland, to give the coastal State the power to
apply its regulations in the contiguous zone:
In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the
coastal state may take measures necessary to prevent and punish
infringements of its customs, fiscal or sanitary regulations, and
violations of its security. 45
This proposal received a majority of the votes but not the twothirds necessary for adoption,46 perhaps because of the addition
of security regulations as a basis for extending competence. Nonetheless, as McDougal and Burke indicate, 47 Article 24, if it is to
correspond with general community policy, should be creatively
interpreted to bestow upon coastal States the occasional power to
prevent or punish" within the contiguous zone. Otherwise, the
severe limitations imposed by a literal reading of the provision
will only serve to encourage unilateral extensions of that continuing
plenary competence normally associated with the territorial sea.
Such acts of expansion would in turn undermine the policy of
free access, whose preservation has been shown to be the major
objective of allowing occasional claims to authority in the contiguous zone.
Legal recognition of occasional claims to limited authority in
the contiguous zone is clearly necessary to perpetuate the policy
of freedom of the seas. Before such claims are entitled to legal
recognition, however, they must be adjudged reasonable in light
of the factual contexts in which they arise, Customary law, upon
which the 1958 Convention was grounded, provides a number of
historical examples of contiguous zone claims held by the community of nations to meet the standard of reasonableness. General
recognition of such claims is evidenced by the familiar pattern of
mutual demand and reciprocal tolerance, as through which customary international law has traditionally developed.
Inasmuch
as the Communist claims in the Pueblo and Mayaguez cases reId. at 618.
45 3 U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records 232, U.N. Doc.
44

A/Conf. 13 (1958).
46Id. at 181.
47 McDOUGAL & BURKE 621.
48

Id. at 585.
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flected concern over the security interests of the coastal State
involved in each seizure, discussion of historical examples of
legally recognized claims to competence in the contiguous zone
will focus on situations involving the security of claimant States.
During the 19th century, nations asserted claims to authority
in the contiguous zone usually to protect against the effects of
belligerent activities. 49 The confrontation between the USS
Kearsarge and the Confederate ship Alabama during the American
Civil War illustrates what John Bassett Moore calls "the distinction . . . between the exercise by a nation of its protective power
and the claim of exclusive possession and jurisdiction ...
."s
The Kearsarge trapped the Alabama in Cherbourg Harbor and
waited to attack as soon as the Confederate ship cleared the 3mile limit on her way out to sea. The French, however, recognizing that the range of both batteries was greater than 3 miles,
demanded that the battle take place farther from the coast. The
Kearsarge acquiesced; and the encounter occurred between 7 and 9
miles from land, the U. S. ship destroying her adversary.5l
Officials in Washington at first denied the validity of French
interference with an American ship beyond the 3-mile territorial
limit but later admitted that, under the particular circumstances,
France had acted reasonably to protect her security interests.5 2
A more recent example of a unilateral assertion of authority
beyond the territorial sea for the purpose of protecting neutral
States from the hostile acts of belligerents may be found in the
Panama Declaration of 1939. Therein the 21 American States
proclaimed their neutrality and established a contiguous zone,
ranging from 300 to 1,200 miles in width, within which hostile
acts by non-American belligerents would be prohibited s3 The
Declaration placed special emphasis on the perceived necessity
of preserving inter-American lines of communication and transportation.
Although the European belligerents protested the
legality of the zone and several times perpetrated hostilities within it, the Declaration has received overwhelming approval4 as a
reasonable exercise of self-protection by the American States.
41

Id. at

589.

50 I. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 723 (1906).
51 Id. at 723-24.
'2 1. WHARTON, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 108-09 (2d

ed.

1887).

53International Conferences of American States 1933-40, at 334 (lst Supp. 1940), reprinted in 34 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 17 (1940).

14McDOUGAL &

BURKE
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Other assertions of control over access to the contiguous zone
for the specific purpose of national security are not limited, as was
the Panama Declaration, to periods of active violence. The Dominican Republic, for example, forbids access without authorization to a specified portion of ocean adjacent to its military
operations area.55 Likewise, -the United States has long made it
a practice to declare off-limits, at least temporarily, certain parts
of the high seas used for military exercises.5 6 However, these
locations are generally not extensive in area and are judiciously
57
selected so as to avoid undue interference with other uses.
Finally, both the United States and Canada regulate access of
aircraft to contiguous airspace by requiring the filing of position
reports in accordance with promulgated guidelines. 5 8
Consensus opinion affirms the right of States to make reasonable assertions of competence within contiguous zones in order to
protect national security. Professor Philip M. Brown summarizes:
' . * [T]he principle of protective jurisdiction enunciated in
the Declaration of Panama has never been repudiated in international law and practice. On the contrary, the consensus of
opinion, as well as practice, overwhelmingly sustains the right
of every nation to defend its laws and security from threatened
violations, under varying circumstances, in the waters contiguous to the conventional three-mile limit, within which
municipal law is supreme.5 9
Given the right to occasional assertions of limited competence
within the contiguous zone, claimant States must nevertheless
exercise this right in such fashion as to meet the test of reasonableness. Indeed, most objections to coastal State claims in the
contiguous zone question the reasonableness of particular attempts
to assert an authority that is generally recognized in principle.
The historical examples of legally recognized claims set forth
in this section clearly conform to the standard of reasonableness.
They succeed in protecting the exclusive interests of the coastal
States without significantly imparing the inclusive interests of
the general community. In fact, both the Kearsarge and Panama
Declaration promote the inclusive interest of the world community

55

Id. at 591.

McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955).
57 McDOUGAL & BURKE 593.
56

59 Id.
59

Brown, ProtectiveJurisdiction, 34 AM. J.
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in maintaining free access to the shipping routes of the high seas.
The control of access to military areas exercised by the Dominican Republic and the United States reflects sincere and successful efforts to minimize interference with free use of the high
seas. On the one hand, the Dominican Republic will authorize
requesting ships to pass through the restricted zone; on the other,
the United States attempts to utilize areas removed from commercial shipping lanes and often restricts access only temporarily.
Finally, U. S.-Canadian regulation of aircraft entering contiguous
airspace merely requires the filing of position reports by approaching planes. This cannot be considered an undue restriction on
the general community of nations in light of the interest intended
to be protected - the security of the North American continent.
2. Evaluation of the Instant Communist Claims to Authority in
the Contiguous Zone. Recognition has been accorded the right of
coastal states to assert occasional claims of limited competence
in the contiguous zone for the purpose of self-protection. Evaluation of the instant Communist claims will focus on the issue of
whether or not the actions taken conform to the standard of reasonableness by which all similar claims are judged. Resolution
of this issue will involve balancing those factors supporting the
Communist claims to exclusive authority against other factors
which may, in the context of the particular incidents, tend to uphold
the inclusive interest of the world community in maintaining freedom of the seas. Relevant factors will include: The significance
of the coastal interest sought to be protected, the relationship
between the authority claimed and the interest at stake, the types
of inclusive activities affected, the frequency of their occurrence,
the significance of such activities for the general community,
the modality and degree of interference with these activities,
and the duration of the interference.60 Reference to previously
cited, legally recognized claims to contiguous zone authority may
provide a basis for proposing reasonable alternative courses of
action which might have been available to the Communists at
the time of each seizure.
Even assuming the sincerity of the Communist belief that
both the Pueblo and Mayaguez constituted grave threats to the
security of Korea and Cambodia61 a thoughtful observer will
conclude that neither claim to competence meets the standard of
reasonableness. Although the interest allegedly sought to be pro60 MCDOUGAL & BURKE 765.
61

Supra note 6.
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tected is significant from the point of view of the coastal States
involved, it bears virtually no relationship to the authority asserted - that is, the competence to shell, board, and remove a
foreign vessel from international waters and to transport captured
crew members to the mainland for the purposes of imprisonment
and torture. Neither can it be argued reasonably that the types
of activity conducted by the Pueblo and Mayaguez justified the
authority asserted by the Communists. The surveillance carried
on by the Pueblo is precisely the sort of intelligence-gathering
operation that is internationally accepted as a necessity of the
cold-war era. 62 The United States recognizes that the large
fleets of Russian trawlers operating just outside its 12-mile exclusive fishing zone 63 contain "snooper" ships similar to the Pueblo;
similarly, the Soviet Union knows it is constantly being surveyed
by American ELINT vessels. Nonetheless, each of the world's
major powers has elected to tolerate such activities, for to do
otherwise would doubtless obstruct the interest of the general
community in maintaining freedom of the high seas and could
lead to a suicidal round of retaliatory maneuvers. If the activities
conducted on the open seas by the Pueblo, when viewed in the
context of the cold-war era, cannot justify the authority claimed
by North Korea, then a fortiori the transportation of commercial
supplies by the Mayaguez cannot support the Cambodian claim
to competence.
The activities of both the Pueblo and Mayaguez are such as are
carried on 24 hours a day throughout the world. The significance
of such activities for the general community obviously cannot be
overrated. The transoceanic transportation of goods is an economic and political necessity, and the electronic gathering of
intelligence protects the inclusive security interest of the free world
community. The States of the world, and especially the United
States as protector of a democratic society, had every right to regard as unreasonable the instant Communist claims to authority,
whose modality was that of force and whose duration could only
be seen as open-ended.
Had the Koreans and Cambodians been sincerely concerned
with the protection of their national security just prior to their
confrontations with the United States, they could have upheld their
exclusive interests through alternative courses of action that
would have minimized interference with the inclusive interests of
62 See GALLERY 9-10.
63

2
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the general community. Anything short of the measures actually
taken might have been deemed reasonable, but certainly in the
case of the Mayaguez a cursory inspection of the ship's papers
and cargo would have sufficed to protect the security interests of
Cambodia. Similarly, a response more reasonable than firing on
and abducting the Pueblo 16 miles off Korea would have been to
demand that she leave the area. Failing this, the North Koreans
should have communicated directly with the U. S. government.
Had they done so, they would have doubtless learned that their
claim to exclude Pueblo from the high seas contiguous to their
territorial waters could not be recognized by either Russia or the
United States. In all likelihood the matter would have ended then
and there.
C.

The United States Claims to the Inviolability of the High Seas

It will be recalled that, with respect to the Pueblo and Mayaguez seizures, the burden of meeting the test of reasonableness
was placed upon the North Koreans and Cambodians. This reflects the heavy priority accorded the principle of free access to
the high seas. 64 Although the Communist claims to competence
in the contiguous zone have already been shown to constitute
unreasonable interferences with the inclusive community interest
in maintaining the freedom of the seas, it will be nonetheless
useful to examine briefly the foundations of this principle as
reflecting the basis and content of the U. S. claims.
International law seeks to secure the widest possible distribution of preferred events among the nations of the world through
the peaceful balancing of competing interests. Exclusive and
inclusive claims must be accommodated through the legal process
in such fashion as to produce the largest total output of community
values at the least cost. 65

Quite obviously, if, with respect to

the use of the oceans of the world, each coastal State were
allowed to assert its exclusive interests at will, no legal accommodation of inclusive and exclusive claims would occur and the
distribution of preferred events would be controlled by - and
limited to - those nations possessing the greatest military power.
Hence, the special importance of maintaining inclusive decision
in the constitutive processes of authority controlling enjoyment
of the high seas. 66
64 McDOUGAL & BURKE
65

Id.

6

Id. at 748.

at 52 n. 128.

765.

PUEBLO AND MAYAGUEZ

1977]

Inclusive decision-making prevents oligarchic control of the
high seas and allows participation by all States in the allocation
of access to the oceans. Keeping in mind (1) the goal of securing
the greatest possible dissemination of shared values among the nations of the world, (2) the necessity of inclusive decision-making
to prevent concentration of preferred events within the most powerful of these nations, and (3) the physical vastness and immeasurable potential of the oceans as a value source, a reasonable observer
is likely to conclude that an allocation of access placing the greater
weight on inclusive use of the high seas would seem most appropriate for promoting a cooperative enjoyment of the oceans
from which all nations can benefit. Inclusivity of use will not
only assure dissemination of shared values but will also encourage
the pooling of technological information relevant to a fuller development of the oceans as a value source. Thus, it may be seen
that the principle of freedom of the seas permits shared use and
provides new uses to be shared.
Of all the inclusive purposes for which the oceans are utilized,
transportation and communication appear least likely to be outweighed by unilateral assertions of exclusive interests. According
to Professor McDougal:
A policy of virtually unrestricted access to the oceans for
certain consequential purposes, such as transport and communication, is to be preferred because these purposes involve
only the largely noncompetitive use of the positional or spatial
characteristics of the sea. In major degree the most valuable
characteristic of the sea is that it is a large and empty space
which can be simultaneously employed by all participants for
movement of persons and goods and for communications. All
that is needed for successful cooperative exploitation are the
relatively minor accommodations required for avoiding physical
interference.
No other important limits, countervailing the
desirability of largely unrestricted access to the oceans as a
spatial resource, have been suggested from perspectives of com67
mon interest.
Application of this policy to the facts surrounding the taking of
the Mayaguez fully supports the U. S. claim to free access of the
high- seas. The Mayaguez was transporting commercial goods in
established shipping lanes and was therefore beholden only to the
United States as flag nation. Although the factual context of
the incident indicates that the Cambodians might have had some
initial basis for exercising limited competence on the high seas,
67

Id. at 749.
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as soon as they ascertained that the Mayaguez posed no security
threat and was merely serving the purpose of commercial transportation they became bound under international law to release
her. Such an outcome would have been in accord with community policy promoting free access, especially as that policy
relates to the noncompetitive uses of transportation and communication.
The particularized application of the general policy of freedom
of the seas to the uses of transportation and communication is
rivaled, in terms of universality of acceptance, only by a similar
application of the general policy to a particular class of ship - the
men-of-war of all nation-states.
Simply stated, the relevant
policy is that "warships on the high seas are wholly immune from
applications of authority by another state."68 This reflects the
inclusive interest of all nations in exclusive control over instruments
essential to their security. That the North Koreans fired on and
captured during peacetime a U. S. warship whose activities were
sanctioned by mutual acceptance on the part of the major powers
of the world can only be regarded as a derogation of the general
principle of freedom of the seas. Just as the Mayaguez was legally protected by the rule of free access as applied to the transportation of goods, so also was the Pueblo, legally, if not practically,
protected by the same rule in its specific application to warships.
In sum, the U. S. claim to inviolability of the high seas appears
to be supported in both cases by accepted community policy and
by the failure of the Communists to conform to the standard of
reasonableness in their assertions of competence.
V.

ASSESSMENT OF THE U.

S. AND COMMUNIST ACTIONS IN TERMS OF

THE LAW RELEVANT TO REGULATION OF COERCION

A.

The Communist Claims: Initiating Coercion as an
Exercise of Reasonable Anticipatory Self-Defense
It will be recalled that both the Koreans and Cambodians at-

tempted to justify their coercive actions as reasonable responses
to perceived threats to national security. The tendency on the part
of the general community to sanction, at least tacitly, unilateral
9
assertions of authority made in the name of self-defense6 com61Id. at 750 n. 58; see Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2313, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, at art. 8.
69McDougal & Schlei, supra note 56, at 674.
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pels a comparison of the instant Communist actions with legallyrecognized claims grounded on the rationale of anticipatory selfdefense.
1. Examples of Anticipatory Self-Defense Claims Recognized in
International Law. In the famous case of the Virginius,70 Spanish
forces captured on the high seas an American ship transporting
arms to insurgents on the island of Cuba. They proceeded to
execute in summary fashion a number of American citizens and
British subjects on board. Great Britain sought reparations for
what it considered a criminal overreaction by the Spanish to the
presence of British subjects on the Virginius but nonetheless conceded the legality of the seizure itself under the circumstances of
the case. 71 The United States, after withdrawing its initial protest, adopted the British position recognizing the right of Spain to
utilize self-defense measures on behalf of national security. 72
On other occasions, the principle of anticipatory self-defense
has justified actual invasions of foreign territory. In the Caroline
case, 73 Canadian troops crossed the Niagara River in order to
seek out and destroy an American vessel which had been used to
ferry supplies from the United States to Canadian rebels on Navy
Island. After gaining the American side of the river, the loyalist
troops engaged in a skirmish with United States nationals, killed
two of them, and then set the Caroline adrift to plummet to her destruction over the Falls. In the subsequent debate over the legality of this invasion of U. S. soil, Great Britain justified its action
on the grounds of self-defense, having anticipated that the Caroline
would be used in an impending attack against Canada. 74 Although the United States initially denied the validity of the British
claim as applied to the particular fact situation, it eventually accepted a diplomatic apology from England without pressing its
contention that Great Britain should be held legally responsible
for the deaths of the two American nationals. Thus, tacit recognition was accorded the British rationale of anticipatory self-defense.
Great Britain reasserted its right to act in defense of national
measure of freedom in unilateral action for maintaining their own security against
external dictation by unlawful violence or threats of violence."
70Id. at 675. The incident occurred in 1873.
71 2 MOORE, supra note 50, at 983.
72 McDougal & Schlei, supra note 56, at 676.
73Mallison,
Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction: National and
Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
at 347 (1962).
74McDougal & Schlei, supra note 56, at 676.
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security when, at the start of World War II, it destroyed most of
the French fleet at Oran.75 The danger that the French Navy
would fall into the hands of Nazi Germany following the Vichy
government's armistice with Hitler in June of 1940 spurred the
British into serving an ultimatum upon the French naval commanders at Oran, Alexandria, and Martinique. 6 The commander at Oran refused to comply with any of the alternative courses
of action listed in the ultimatum, each of which would have prevented the incorporation of his ships into the German Navy.
Thereupon the British used air and naval forces to attack and destroy most of the Oran fleet, justifying this apparently drastic
action by invoking the principle of anticipatory self-defense. The
circumstances surrounding the incident compel recognition of the
validity of this assertion, especially when it is recalled that in 1940
Great Britain stood alone in the face of the Nazi onslaught. The
United States would not enter the war for 18 months, the Germans
were bombing London nightly, and Hitler had not yet decided to
leave England to the Luftwaffe and concentrate his forces on the
Russian front. The British had every reason to expect that, had
the Germans captured the French fleet intact, they would have
deployed it against England. Hence the destruction of the French
warships at Oran was not only justified but mandated by the facts
as they existed in July 1940.
The extent to which conventional international law has recognized national self-defense claims can be demonstrated by reference to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. 7 By this treaty, most
of the nations of the world renounced "war as an instrument of
national policy" and, significantly, chose to omit from the text any
express reservation of the right of self-defense.78 That right was
considered so well grounded in international law as to preclude
any need of citing it in the Pact. Indeed, the United States regarded the right as "inherent in every sovereign state and
implicit in every treaty."79
2. The Requirements of Anticipatory Self-Defense in International
Law. The foregoing illustrations of national self-defense claims
recognized in customary international law all reflect the two legal
75Mallison, supra note 73, at 349.
76Id. n. 74a.
77 3.HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1682-85 (2d ed. 1945).
78Id. at 1683.
79Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., exec. L, pt. 1, at 102 (1949).
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requisites with which such claims must comply in order to be
deemed lawful: Those of necessity and proportionality. 0 Both
principles flow from the basic objective of international law set
out at the beginning of this paper: That is, the goal of securing the
widest possible distribution of shared values among the people of
the world. In the absence. of a centralized authority capable of
securing and upholding an optimum public order dedicated to the
peaceful achievement of all values,81 the maintenance of a minimum public order for the purpose of conserving shared values
may at times require that individual states utilize force in responding to reasonably perceived threats to their security. However,
in order to minimize the destruction of values occasioned by the
use of coercive measures, a nation-state may not lawfully inflict
upon its adversaries such harm as is disproportionate to "the
legitimate defensive requirements of the state."82 Simply put, a
nation can justify coercive action in terms of self-defense only
when, in light of the surrounding circumstances, it may be deemed
to have acted out of reasonably perceived necessity and in proportion to the demands placed on its security by the initiating coercion or perceived threat.
3. Evaluation of the Communist Claims by a Comparative Application of the Basic Legal Requirements of Self-Defense to the Instant
Claims and to the Legally Recognized Claim of the British at Oran. Professor McDougal and Mr. Feliciano have posited several factors
which are particularly relevant to appraising self-defense claims
3
in terms of the requirements of necessity and proportionality.
These criteria will be applied to the facts surrounding the Communist seizures of the Pueblo and Mayaguez, after which appropriate distinctions will be drawn in terms of these factors between
the instant Communist actions and the self-defense measures carried out by the British at Oran.
a.

Application of Specific Criteria to the Communist Actions
(1)

Characteristicsof the Participants

When North Korea and Cambodia accomplished their respective captures of American vessels on the high seas, each be80Mallison, supra note 73, at 355.
81McDougal & Schlei, supra note
82 1 HYDE, supra note 77, at 237.

56, at 674.

83M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
DER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 220 (1961)
cited as MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO].
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longed to a group of small-to-medium-sized Communist satellite
nations whose military and civilian technologies can only be described as underdeveloped and largely dependent on gratuitous
By contrast, the
hand-outs from Russia and/or Red China.
United States was and remains one of the two major powers in the
world. The question is, however, to what extent did this obvious
disparity in size, power, and technology in fact preclude America
from providing any realistic threat to the national security of the
claimant States. The very fact that the Koreans and Cambodians
gambled their small forces on the probability that they could attack American ships with impunity undermines the credibility of
any Communist attempts to justify the seizures as necessitated by
realistically perceived threats. They recognized what many U. S.
officials and scientists had surmised all along, that America's
power may be too big to use. At least in the case of the Pueblo,
the Communists guessed correctly that the fear of starting a nuclear
holocaust with Russia would prevent the United States from sending in the military to rescue the spy ship. Thus, it may be concluded that America's vast superiority in size, power, and technology posed no threat under the circumstances to Cambodia or North
Korea; on the contrary, it actually enabled the Communists to
"kick sand" at the giant without fear.

(2)

Objectives of the Claimants

The objectives of the participants claiming self-defense may be
evaluated in terms of factors such as extension or conservation
of values, consequentiality of values conserved, and inclusivity
or exclusivity of the objectives. 84
(a)

Conservation or Extension of Values

The legitimate goal of self-defense is conservation of the status
quo. According to Professor McDougal:
The very conception of self-defense implies that the purpose
of the defender is to conserve its values rather than to extend
them through acquiring or destroying values held by the opposing participant. 85
It is difficult to see how the seizures of the Pueblo and Mayaguez
served merely to protect and maintain existing values in Korea and
Cambodia. Had the Koreans been truly concerned with the main84Id. at 222.
85Id.
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tenance of national security, they would never have dared attack
an American warship in the first place, particularly since the use
of such snooper ships had for years been tacitly sanctioned by
the two major powers of the world. As noted above, the Koreans
gambled that fear of escalation would prevent the U. S. from retaliating. This gamble, irrational as it seems, paid off. The subsequent extortions of confessions from the Pueblo's crew and an
apology from the United States clearly effectuated the extension
- as opposed to conservation - of Communist values.
Similarly, the Cambodian capture of the Mayaguez and removal of her crew to the mainland cannot reasonably be viewed
as actions taken to protect the status quo. In light of the then
recent Communist takeover in Cambodia and the outcome of the
infamous Pueblo incident, the United States had every reason to
believe that history was about to repeat itself and that retaliation
would be warranted. Had the Cambodians really been concerned
with the conservation of values, they would have anticipated the
aggressive attitude taken by American officials and not gambled
irrationally that lightning would strike twice for the Third World.
Although the ultimate purposes for which the Communists transported the crew of the Mayaguez to the mainland will remain unknown, it seems safe to assume that the conservation of Cambodian values was not one of them.
(b)

Consequentiality of Values Conserved

Three factors already mentioned preclude reference to this criterion in evaluating the Communist objectives. First, the use of
coerced confessions for propaganda purposes by the captors of the
Pueblo effectively eliminates the possibility that they were acting
solely to conserve consequential values. Likewise, the absence
of any relationship between the removal of the Mayaguez crew to
Kompong Som and the protection of Cambodian security rather
clearly indicates an attempted extension of values, thereby mooting the question of consequentiality of values conserved. Finally,
the irrationality of both seizures compels the conclusion that these
were out-and-out gambles taken by irresponsible leaders more interested in risking national security for the sake of obtaining propaganda and embarrassing the United States than in protecting the
values of their countrymen.
(c)

Inclusivity or Exclusivity of the Objectives

The claims of the North Koreans and Cambodians are inclusive in one aberrational sense only: They can be said to benefit
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the cause of all totalitarian Communist governments by adversely
affecting the international credibility of the United States. Obviously, inclusivity in this respect does not further the peaceful
distribution of shared values and freedom from coercion, which the
legal requirements of necessity and proportionality are intended
to promote.
(3)

Methods Employed by the Claimants

The methods utilized by the nation-state claiming self-defense
relate directly to a determination of the proportionality of the response"86 Even assuming, factual contexts notwithstanding, that
the Koreans and Cambodians were acting to protect national security, the use of machine guns and rocket fire against an unarmed merchant vessel and the deployment of MiG fighters
against a radar ship whose two machine guns were visibly inoperable87 and unmanned cannot be held to meet even the broadest
formulation of the proportionality test. It goes without saying
that the removal of both crews to the mainland and the incarceration and torture of the men of the Pueblo render even less tenable
the Korean claim to proportionality in the exercise of self-defense.
(4)

Conditions and the Expectation of Necessity

Assessment of self-defense claims in terms of the requirement
of necessity must involve an estimate of the overall nature of the
,threat to which the claimant State is responding. In other words,
a determination that necessity warranting self-defense does or
does not exist in a particular context depends on a consideration
of conditions such as "the relative size and power of the participant charged, the nature and consequentiality of its objectives, the
character of its internal institutional structures, the kind of world
public order it demands, the intensity and magnitude of [the
threat posed, and] expectations about effective community intervention. "88
Prior discussion of the characteristics of the participants indicated that the relative size and power of the United States posed
no threat, under the particular circumstances surrounding the seizures of the Pueblo and Mayaguez, to either Korea or Cambodia.
Furthermore, the American objectives were: (a) in the case of the
86 Id. at 228-29, 241-44.
87 Hearings, supra note 10, at 757.
The gun covers were caked with ice and
not easily removable.
s8 McDOUGAL & FELICIANO supra note 83, at 230.
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Mayaguez, commercial in nature and supportive of inclusive community policy relating to the use of the high seas for transportation and communication, and (b) in the case of the Pueblo, sanctioned by the major powers and supportive of the inclusive interests of the free world. Inasmuch as the institutions and public
order advocated by the United States reflect a national objective
of protecting existing values,89 the Koreans and Cambodians
would appear to have little basis for forecasting such imminent
danger to their national security as would necessitate military assault on two hopelessly vulnerable vessels. Perhaps the clearest
indication of the extent to which the Pueblo and Mayaguez could
reasonably be considered threats to the security. of the respective
claimants lies in the fact that no other Southeast Asian States
supported the charges of the captors. Absent any collective claim
to self-defense by neighboring countries in response to the presence of the Mayaguez and Pueblo in Asian waters, the unilateral assertions of necessity by the Koreans and Cambodians lose whatever credibility they may have otherwise had.9°
b.

The Communist Claim Distinguishedfrom the
Legally-Recognized British Claim at Oran

Application of the criteria of characteristics, objectives, methods,
and conditions to the instant claims of self-defense has demonstrated the untenability of the Communist position regarding necessity and proportionality. By contrast, an appraisal of the British
actions at Oran in terms of these criteria clearly validates the
destruction of the French fleet as a proportional response necessitated by the surrounding circumstances.
Assessment of the
characteristics of Germany and England in 1940 reveals, on the one
hand, a militaristic oligarchy in the process of subjugating Europe
to the command of a maniacal fascist leader and, on the other, an
island sovereignty whose freedom hinged precariously on a 25mile stretch of open sea which separated it from the rest of Europe.
The ships of the Oran fleet in German hands could have been
used to transport German soldiers across that channel.
89Mallison, supra note 73, at 358.
90An example of a collective response in support of a unilateral assertion
of self-defense can be found in the Resolution of the Provisional Organ of
Consultation of the Organization of American States, promulgated during the
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The Resolution recommended that member-states
"take all measures . . . including the use of armed force" to prevent the introduction of Soviet offensive weapons

(Nov. 12, 1962).

into Cuba.
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Clearly the objectives of Great Britain in destroying the French
warships included the conservation of democratic values in Europe
and the protection of the rest of the free world. England saw
herself as acting in an inclusive, representative capacity. Even
the French seem to have regarded as reasonable her methods of
response to the German threat - the French naval commanders
at Alexandria, Egypt, and Martinique, French West Indies, accepted the ultimatum rejected at Oran and disposed of their
ships accordingly,91 doubtless recognizing the validity of the
British claim of self-defense. Finally, England had every reason
to consider the ominousness of the conditions then prevailing in
Europe, as demonstrated by the extension of German military
power throughout nations such as Poland, Belgium, and France
and into Scandinavia.
In contrast to the seizures of the Pueblo
and Mayaguez, the British destruction of the Oran fleet, under the
circumstances, "must be regarded as covered by the rigid legal
requirements of action taken in self-preservation. "92
B.

The American Responses to Pueblo and Mayaguez

To be recognized as lawful, responding coercion must meet
the same requirements of necessity and proportionality applicable
to an assessment of initiating coercion based on self-defense.
The only difference between the two situations is a factual one:
The initiating coercion based on self-defense constitutes a response to a reasonably perceived threat whereas the responding
coercion, likewise grounded in terms of self-defense, is a reaction
to the initiating coercion.
1. Application of the Requirements of Necessity and Proportionality
to the American Responses. Factors contributing to America's weak
response following the capture of the Pueblo included division of
responsibility for the spy ship, the then prevailing U. S. political
climate, and fear of escalation. 93 Referral of the matter to the
U. N. Security Council was, by itself, so innocuous a response as
to render meaningless any discussion of necessity and proportionality in the context of a self-defense claim. It is difficult to see
how such action, without more, contributed to the preservation
of community values.
By contrast, America's forceful response to the seizure of the
Mayaguez demands an appraisal in terms of the legal require91 Mallison, supra note 73, at 349 n. 74a.
92 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
93-See

§ II-E supra.

303 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
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ments of necessity and proportionality. It will be recalled that,
following Cambodia's apparent rejection of U. S. diplomatic efforts, President Ford ordered a three-pronged attack on the
captors, launching an amphibious assault on Tang Island where
the crew was erroneously believed to have been taken, dispatching
a marine boarding party to retrieve the Mayaguez anchored off
Tang, and having U. S. planes bomb selected mainland targets
at Kompong Som and Ream Airbase. 94 The cost of this 1-day
operation in terms of American lives amounted to 15 marines killed
on Tang, 3 missing and presumed dead, 50 wounded, and 23 others
killed in a related helicopter crash in Utapao, Thailand. 95
Balanced against this loss of life was the fact that a failure to take
decisive action would have provided further evidence of U. S.
weakness overseas and an invitation to other adversaries to test
American will.
a.

Application of Specific Criteria to the U. S. Actions
Against Cambodia
(1)

Characteristicsof the Participants

Prior analysis has indicated that the disparity in size, power,
and technology between America and Cambodia may have had an
inhibiting effect on U. S. willingness to retaliate. However, the
memory of Pueblo, the anger aroused by the seizure of the Mayaguez shortly after an inglorious American exit from Cambodia,
and perhaps the realization that no threat of escalation existed
helped overcome initial reticence about using force to retrieve
the merchant ship.
(2)

Objectives of the Claimant

The United States in recapturing the Mayaguez was acting to
insure the survival of her crewmen, to uphold the inclusive community interest in freedom of the seas, and, most importantly,
to protect a way of life, dedicated to the maintenance of existing
values, from being eroded by the gradual extension of Communist
power through use of military force. It is worth noting, with respect to the retaking of the Mayaguez, that in the hierarchy of
American values the preservation of a way of life has always
outranked the preservation of individual lives. Was this principle
temporarily forgotten when, in the aftermath of the Pueblo crisis,
Supra note 6, at 13.
9 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 2, 1975, at 29.
'4

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 9: 79

the Pentagon stated that to send troops into Wonsan would have
resulted in the death of Bucher and his men? %
(3) Conditions and the Expectation of Necessity
The American resort to force following the capture of the
Mayaguez was justifiable in light of then recent events tending
to create a reasonable expectation of the necessity of forceful
action. The Communist take-overs in Vietnam and Cambodia
posed a serious threat to the remaining non-Communist nations
in Southeast Asia, many of which depend on the United States
to maintain some sort of equilibrium between itself and the Soviet
Union in that part of the world. A Pueblo-like response on the
part of the United States to the seizure of the Mayaguez would
have been interpreted as yet another indication of America's growing inability to uphold the interests of the free world in the face of
Communist aggression in Southeast Asia and could have spurred
nations like Thailand to throw in their lot with the Communists
for the sake of physical, if not spiritual, self-preservation. To
some extent, then, the maintenance of existing values in the form
of a rough equilibrium between the United States and Soviet
Union in the Far East could reasonably be expected to depend on
a swift and firm American response to the Cambodian action.
More importantly, the continued existence of the United States
"as an effective participant in the world community process ' 97
may be said to have required the use of force against Cambodia
once - but only when - it had been conclusively determined that
diplomatic efforts had failed. When an alleged "super power"
surrenders two ships in a span of 7 years to a pair of fourth-rate
navies, it may reasonably expect its credibility and status as an
effective participant in the general community of nations to suffer.
The severity of the situation is magnified when this nation happens
to be the standardbearer of the free world, whose function is to
implement a policy dedicated to the maintenance of existing values
and to the distribution of these values throughout the earth. Any
impairment of this nation's status as an effective participant in
the general community process will adversely affect the distribution
of preferred events which it seeks to accomplish and will abet
the cause of totalitarian Communism. According to Professor
Mallison,
%' GALLERY, supra note 3, at 23.
WMallison, supra note 73, at 360.
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[A] target state is authorized to act unilaterally in selfdefense when it reasonably expects that it must use the military
instrument of national policy to preserve its . . . continued
existence as an effective participant in the world community
98
processes.
Resort to military power in self-defense is warranted a fortiori
when the interests at stake include the very object of the international law decision-making process - that is, the world-wide distribution of shared values.
(4)

Methods Employed by the Claimant: A Question of
Legality

Although America's use of force in responding to the Mayaguez incident appears justifiable in terms of the criteria of characteristics, objectives, and conditions, the methods employed cast doubt
on the ultimate validity of the overall pattern of response. It will
be recalled that the initial American response to the seizure of
the Mayaguez was to send notes requesting the crew's release to
the Chinese government and the Cambodian Embassy in Peking. 99 This took place on the afternoon of May 12, 1975,
within 12 hours of the capture. Although the notes were returned
without response 24 hours later, neither the President nor Secretary of State Kissinger viewed this as a final rejection of diplomacy, the latter commenting, "It [the return] didn't mean
anything. The Chinese have good Xerox machines."100 Despite
his belief that the Cambodian Embassy in Peking was relaying
the message to its government, the President, on May 13, warned
the Cambodians through the Chinese that he would give them only
24 hours to surrender the Mayaguez and her crew. When this
period had elapsed, the President launched the U. S. attacks on
Tang and the Mayaguez at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of May 14
(dawn on May 15, Cambodian time). Less than 2 hours later,
Phnompenh broadcast a lengthy, propaganda-filled announcement ordering the Mayaguez to withdraw from "Cambodian waters,"
but mentioning nothing about the release of the crew, whereupon
Ford announced that the assault would be stopped as soon as
the crew was set free. An hour and a half passed; and, at 8:45
p.m. (7:45 a.m. Cambodian time), the planes of the USS Coral
Sea took off to bomb selected mainland targets, including a
98 Id.

99Morris, supra note 16, at 9.
100id.
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Kompong Som oil depot and Ream Airbase. At 10:45 p.m., the
men of the USS Wilson observed the approach of a Thai fishing
boat carrying the crew of the Mayaguez, and by 11:07 p.m., the
crew had been picked up.
The bombing of Ream Airbase
commenced at 10:50 p.m., the attack on the oil depot at 11:50
p.m.
This rapid sequence of events raises two issues affecting the
validity of the U. S. response in terms of the criterion of methods
used. First, did the United States make full use of diplomatic
channels, allowing for sufficient lag time in the communications
process and avoiding resort to simultaneous military coercion
when a diplomatic solution was already underway? Second, did
the United States respond proportionally to conserve values, or
punitively to destroy them?
With respect to the first of these questions, it appears from
comments made by White House aides 01 that the President had
"no idea" whether the Cambodians had received his May 12 note.
At the same time, however, Kissinger was asserting that the
messages of May 12 and 13 had both gotten through and that the
Chinese had "counseled restraint" by Cambodia.102 Whichever
was the case, it seems clear that Washington reacted to the
seizure of the Mayaguez with virtually no diplomatic feedback on
the intentions of the new Cambodian government.
The dangers inherent in such circumstances are readily made
apparent by reference to the events described in detail above.
It will be recalled that the small fishing boat carrying the crew
of the Mayaguez reached the destroyer Wilson less than 6 hours
after the commencement of the assault on Tang, having sailed
more than 30 miles from Rong Island just off Kompong Som.
As it turned out, the Cambodians had placed the crew aboard the
fishing vessel 1 hour before the commencement of the assault on
Tang t 3 - hence the strong probability that the Communists had
released the crew not in response to Marine guns but rather as a
diplomatic decision. In support of this likelihood are the lengthy
and painstakingly propagandized contents of the Phnompenh
broadcast ordering the Mayaguez to leave Cambodian waters.
Although delivered 2 hours after Ford had initiated the assault
on Tang, the message was obviously in writing prior to the U. S.
attack.104
101
102

Id.
Id.

103Supra note

6, at 14.

104Morris, supra note 16, at 9.

PUEBLO AND MAYAGUEZ

1977]

If, then, as events seem to indicate, a diplomatic solution was
in progress at the time of the Tang raid, the United States was
indeed fortunate to recover the Mayaguez crew. Had these men
not already been released, a Cambodian government that had previously decided to surrender them in response to communiques
from Peking might well have reversed its decision under military
coercion. 105 In such circumstances, failure to exhaust the diplomatic process or at least to make an informed determination as
to the intentions of the Cambodian regime before resorting to military force would have greatly reduced the chances for a speedy
recovery of the Mayaguez and her crew. Legally speaking, the
result would have been an unjustifiable destruction of values,
caused by ill-conceived responding coercion, implemented in haste
and violative of the requirement of actual necessity.
The issue of whether the United States reacted in accordance
with the legal requisite of proportionality in responding coercion
must likewise be resolved by reference to the facts. At 11:07
p.m. (10:07 a.m. Cambodian time), the destroyer Wilson picked
up the crew of the Mayaguez intact. Word reached the President
at 11:08 p.m. that only 30 of the 39 crew members had been retrieved, but this report was corrected by 11:15 p.m. to indicate
that all 39 men were safe. At 11:50 p.m., American planes
bombed an oil depot near Kompong Som.1 6
Government officials indicated later that the air raids on Ream
Airbase (10:50 p.m.) and Kompong Som were intended to protect
the Marines pinned down on Tang Island.107 However, simple
logic as well as military tactics would have demanded either a
preventive strike coordinated with the amphibious landing several
hours earlier or a simple surveillance of the Cambodian mainland
to insure that no enemy planes or gunboats were launched. In
this way, the United States could have acted to conserve values
rather than destroy them needlessly. Unfortunately, the absence
of coordination between the bombing strikes and the Marine
landing at Tang as well as the fact that the oil depot raid occurred
half an hour after the Mayaguez crew boarded the Wilson suggest
that the bombing be viewed as punitive and therefore violative
of the requirement of proportionality in responding coercion.

105

Id.

106Supra

note 6, at 14.
supra note 16, at 10.

107Morris,
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IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN CRISIS DIPLOMACY

In theory, crisis diplomacy should be governed by the contextually-oriented application of principles of international law
to specific fact situations. Thoughtful action grounded on legal
analysis will limit the destruction of shared values and facilitate the
attainment of a maximum public order.
The foregoing legal evaluation of the Pueblo and Mayaguez
incidents attempts to ascertain the validity or invalidity of the
various claims asserted and actions taken by the participants
to the disputes and, on the basis of the conclusions reached,
to provide suggestions for the future conduct of crisis diplomacy
in similar situations involving isolated aggression on the high seas.
It has been shown that the Communist seizures were unlawful
in terms of both the applicable law of the sea and the principles
governing claims of self-defense.
The conclusion reached with
respect to the American assertions of inviolability of the high seas
was that such claims were reasonable under the circumstances
and supportive of established community policy. However, the
responses of the United States in both instances have been
criticized for failing to conserve inclusive community values.
The implications of Pueblo and Mayaguez for U. S. crisis
diplomacy are clear. In order to protect and maintain existing
shared values in the face of future isolated acts of aggression on
the high seas, the United States must be prepared to implement
measures of responding coercion intermediate in intensity to the
two extremes reflected in the Pueblo and Mayaguez incidents.
Such measures include the full use and, if necessary, the exhaustion of diplomatic channels; the avoidance of simultaneous military
coercion once a diplomatic solution is in progress; the controlled
application of force when diplomacy has clearly failed to protect
values; and the refusal to inflict punitive damages (those that are
not reasonably necessary to compel the adversary to terminate
18
the condition which threatens inclusive community interests). 0
Failure to adopt a crisis-management policy which embodies these
elements may well "present a future adversary with the prospect
of a diplomacy he cannot trust and a military operation neither
side can measure."109 More than this, it would constitute an
abdication of America's continuing responsibility to insure the
maintenance of a minimum public order based on the tenets of
international law.
108

McDOUGAL & FELICIANO supra note 83, at 242.

"I Morris, supra note 16, at 11.
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APPENDIX
Rejection of View that Wai Islands Formed Part of Territory Belonging
to Cambodia at Time of Mayaguez Incident
An assertion that the Mayaguez, when captured, was steaming in
Cambodian territorial waters would necessitate a legal analysis grounded
on the doctrine of innocent passage.110 This view, however, assumes
that the 31 -week old Sihanouk regime had in fact reduced to its possession the Wai Islands, whose 12-mile marginal belt intersected the
Hong Kong - to - Sattahip shipping lanes. Only if such sovereignty
is shown to have been established can the summary seizure of the
Mayaguez be recognized as a legitimate exercise of Cambodia's plenary
authority to regulate passage within its territorial waters. If, on the
other hand, sovereignty cannot be shown, the inclusive interest of the
world community in safe and speedy transit between Hong Kong and
Sattahip must be taken to limit Cambodia's attempt to exercise over
extra-territorial waters that comprehensive competence generally associated with control of territorial and inland waters.
At the time of the Mayaguez incident, sovereignty over the Wai
Islands was claimed by three states Cambodia, Vietnam, and
Thailand."
Professor Paust emphasizes that the existence of such
claims, regardless of which one was the strongest, precludes characterization of the waters surrounding the islands as "international". 2
This conclusion, however, is of secondary importance to a determination
of whether Cambodia itself could assert comprehensive sovereignty over
the islands and thus the waters - in question.
Professor Paust
concludes that it could lawfully do so because it "exercised control
3
over the islands at the same time that it made a claim of ownership. "1
(It is interesting, although not important for our purposes, to note here
that, within four weeks of the recovery of the Mayaguez, Vietnamese
troops had driven the Cambodians from the Wai Islands).114
Professor Paust thus intimates that the legal requisites necessary
to establish territorial sovereignty over the islands in question could
be and were in fact satisfied by the self-serving assertions of the
Sihanouk government.
That is, as long as Cambodia combined even
temporary control over the territory with a claim of ownership, it established good title to the land and its coastal waters. This point of
view, however, disregards an essential component of territoriality, namely
the principle that "occupation, to constitute a claim to territorial sovereignty, must . . . offer certain guarantees to other states and their
nationals."iis Certainly the most basic of these would be the guarantee
no M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANs 37 (1962).
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Times, June 14, 1975, at 1, col. 4.
115 The
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of protection, within the claimed territory, of the rights of other states,
"in particular their right to integrity and inviolability . . . . together
with the rights which each state may claim for its nationals in foreign
territory", for a period at least "long enough to enable any Power who
might have considered herself as possessing sovereignty over the
(territory), or having a claim to sovereignty, to have . ..a reasonable
possibility for ascertaining the existence of a state of things contrary
to her real or alleged rights."I16
It cannot be seriously contended that the Cambodian regime, which
had occupied the Wai Islands for the first time only 2 weeks before
seizing the Mayaguez, t17 and had started seizing Thai fishing boats in the
area as early as May 2,118 complied with this inclusive, communityoriented aspect of territoriality, essential to establishing the validity of
any inchoate claim to sovereignty. Indeed, to support Cambodia in her
premature assertion of comprehensive sovereignty over the Wai Islands
is to vitiate the expectational function served by the concept of territoriality:
namely, the promotion of predictability and orderliness in international
relations which flows from a recognition by each state of the spatial
limitations confining the exercise of exclusive competence by every other
state. Because Cambodia's claim to comprehensive authority over the
Wai Islands did not begin to comply with this basic element of the legal
concept of territorial sovereignty, that claim must be considered defective; and subsequent analysis must proceed on the theory that the Mayaguez incident was not an innocent passage case.
116
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